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AVOIDING THE TRAP OF RESJUDICATA: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE TO LITIGATING MULTIPLE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Res Judicata is a central principle of the United States judicial system.1 It ensures the economical use of the courts and protects parties
from having to defend the same action on multiple occasions. 2 Allowing
plaintiffs to recover for wrongs is also a central feature of our judicial system.3 The judicial system supplies a forum for citizens to resolve disputes
in a civil and consistent manner, rather than allowing haphazard solutions
4
between citizens.
1. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) ("Application of
[resjudicata] is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established,
the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions.").
2. See Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion:Reconciling Administrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367, 370 (1990) ("The doctrines
of res judicata ... [and] claim . . . preclusion . . . serve important interests in
assuring repose to disputes, finality and predictability of decisions, and in reducing
costs associated with multiple adjudications of the same matter."); see also Churchill
v. Star Enters., 3 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that bringing all
claims together promotes judicial economy and allowing separate claims is burdensome to defendants), aff'd, 183 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1999).
In many decisions, the terms "claim preclusion" and "resjudicata" have been
used interchangeably. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998)
("Claim preclusion (resjudicata) ... is an affirmative defense."); Heyliger v. State
Univ. & Community College Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 1997) (using "res judicata" in section defining claim preclusion); Board of Trustees of
Trucking Employees v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that claim
preclusion was formerly referred to as res judicata); Bieg v. Hovnanian Enters.,
Inc., No. CIV.A.98-5528, 1999 WL 1018578, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1999) (using res
judicata as synonym for claim preclusion). Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary defines res judicata as the "[r]ule that a final judgment rendered on the merits is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). The definition
given for claim preclusion is merely a cross-reference to "Res (resjudicata)." Id. at
248. The two terms, however, have been distinguished by noting that claim preclusion is a subset of resjudicata. See United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d
977, 983 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that claim preclusion is one aspect of res
judicata and that res judicata encompasses both claim and issue preclusion). For
purposes of this Casebrief, claim preclusion and res judicata will be used
interchangeably.
3. See, e.g., Eric James Moss, Note, The Breadth of Complete Preemption: Limiting
the Doctrine to its Roots, 76 VA. L. REv. 1601, 1605 (1990) (noting that federal judicial
system provides forum for consistent enforcement of federal laws).
4. See generally Paul D. Carrington, CrowdedDockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 542
(1969) (noting that courts function to institutionalize decision making); Yvonne T.
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The issue of resjudicata, or claim preclusion, is especially relevant in
the area of employment discrimination because plaintiffs can often use
more than one statutory claim to seek redress for wrongs. 5 Although
there are multiple bases for employment discrimination claims, not all
statutes provide uniform procedures for filing claims. 6 As a consequence
of the varying procedures, the plaintiff runs an added risk of being unable
to recover under multiple statutes. 7 The plaintiff is in the odd position of
having more than one claim with different statutes of limitations, while
facing the potential ramifications of claim preclusion.8 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Harding v. Duquesne Light Co.9

Kuczynski, Note, Administrative ResJudicataand the Age Discriminationin Employment
Act, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1111, 1129 (1989) (discussing use of resjudicata to conserve judicial resources).
5. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982) ("A
single cause of action may comprise claims under a number of different statutory
and common law grounds."); see alsoJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 455 (1975) (discussing both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as bases for
employee discrimination suit); Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 184 (3d Cir.
1999) (bringing employment discrimination charges under Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA"), Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act ("PHRA")); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 778 F.2d 955, 957-58
(3d Cir. 1985) (stating basis of claim under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Shannon v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.98-5277, 1999 WL 126097, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 5, 1999) (analyzing FM[A, PHRA and ADA in employee discrimination
suit); Sicoli v. Nabisco Biscuit Co., No. CIV.A.96-6053, 1998 WL 614840, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (alleging violations of FMLA, ADA and PHRA); Lantz v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., No. CIV.A.96-2671, 1996 WL 442795, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July
30, 1996) (basing suit on ADA, PHRA and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA")); Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., No. CIV.A.95-589, 1995 WL 916926,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1995) (basing suit on Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
ADA and PHRA).
6. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)
(requiring filing with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
before bringing action based on ADA), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994) (requiring filing with EEOC), with Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994) (allowing plaintiff to proceed
to court without filing with EEOC), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (same). See also
118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7167 (1972) (discussing procedure for filing with EEOC for
claim based on Tide VII); Silver, supra note 2, at 383-84 ("Unlike section 1983,
Title VII creates a scheme which requires a complaining party to give a state or
federal agency an opportunity to resolve his complaint before he may file suit in
federal court.").
7. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465-66 (finding that filing with EEOC for claim
under Tide VII does not toll statute of limitations for § 1981 claim, and that plaintiff must take necessary steps to preserve each claim separately); Shannon, 1999 WL
126097, at *4 n.4 (noting that filing discrimination charge with EEOC does not toll
FMLA statute of limitations).
8. For a discussion of cases where plaintiffs have multiple lawsuits on the same
cause of action, see infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
9. No. CIV.A.95-589, 1995 WL 916926 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1995).
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and Churchillv. StarEnterprises,10 became one of the first circuits to provide
guidance on this unique problem in employment discrimination."
Although some employment statutes require an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filing ("EEOC claims"), other statutes
do not require such a filing ("non-EEOC claims").' 2 Thus, while plaintiffs
are waiting to exhaust the administrative remedies on their EEOC claims,
the statute of limitations may run on their non-EEOC claims.' 3 Additionally, if the plaintiff brings the claims separately, he or she runs the risk of
4
losing his or her right to sue under the doctrine of claim preclusion.'
In an attempt to clearly delineate this problem, Part II of this
Casebrief will provide a general discussion of the doctrine of claim preclusion, the requisite administrative filing for the EEOC claims and employment discrimination jurisprudence in the Third Circuit. 15 Part III will
analyze recent cases and discuss the necessary steps that attorneys should
take to litigate effectively in this area.' 6 Part IV will outline the other areas
in employment discrimination jurisprudence where this issue may arise
17
and highlight potential future complications for litigants.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Problem of Balancing Statutes of Limitationsfor Plaintiffs with
Multiple Claims

When plaintiffs have multiple bases for recovery, they have an obligation to preserve all claims independently.' 8 A plaintiff may encounter
claim preclusion when it is necessary to follow different procedures for
each statutory claim. 19 For example, in Nernberg v. United States,20 the
10. 183 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1999).
11. SeePavon v. Swift Trans. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing Third Circuit as one circuit that has answered question of claim preclusion
in employment discrimination claim).
12. For examples of statutes with different administrative procedures, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of potential problems with the statute of limitations, see
infra note 61 and accompanying text.
14. See Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/ClaimPreclusion:Judgmentfor the Claimant,
62 Nw. U. L. REv. 357, 358 (1967) (noting that claim preclusion applies when
plaintiff attempts to bring second suit on same claim).
15. For a discussion on the principles of resjudicata and administrative filing
in the context of employment jurisprudence in the Third Circuit, see infra notes
18-93 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion on the recent developments in the Third Circuit, see
infra notes 94-151 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion on the probable future applications and problems in employment jurisprudence, see infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
18. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975)
(noting plaintiff's obligation to preserve all claims individually).
19. For examples of plaintiffs that have suffered from this dilemma, see infra
notes 62-93 and accompanying text.
20. 463 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
barred the plaintiffs from bringing a second lawsuit on the same cause of
action, despite the fact that the plaintiffs could not have brought the actions together. 21 The plaintiffs were in a difficult situation because if they
had waited to bring both claims together after they exhausted their administrative remedies on one claim (a prerequisite to bringing the claim), the
22
other claim would have been barred under the statute of limitations.
Thus, a plaintiff, trying to recover under both administrative and non-ad23
ministrative claims, is in a precarious position.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has offered
some suggestions to aid plaintiffs, which include: 1) informing the court
of any problem with awaiting administrative claims; or 2) asking for leave
to amend rather than bringing a second claim. 24 This issue has become
significant in the area of employment law.2 5 For example, in Churchill,the
Third Circuit resolved a similar issue as a matter of first impression regarding separate claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). 26

21. See id. at 754 (holding that claim was dismissed based on res judicata).
The plaintiffs, Maurice and Nancy Nernberg, brought a suit against the United
States based on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See id. at 752.
On July 1, 1977, the plaintiffs brought a claim against the United States for the
same injury based on the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). See id. Six days later,
the plaintiffs filed an administrative claim to secure their suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. See id. at 753. The first claim was dismissed before the plaintiffs
were able to exhaust their administrative remedies enabling them to bring the
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id. (noting plaintiffs' reason for not
bringing claims together).
22. See id. at 754 (noting that plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot justify burdening judicial system with multiple complaints).
23. See id. (" [W)e find that in the circumstances of this case the failure of the
Plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies on their claims . . .does not
prevent the application of the doctrine of res judicata to dismiss their present
action.").
24. See id. (noting options plaintiffs could have taken to preserve both
claims). The Third Circuit found that the plaintiffs could have reasonably anticipated having another claim based on the same wrong. See id. ("When they filed
their first suit, the Plaintiffs clearly could have anticipated that they would also seek
relief under another federal statute . . . ."). Thus, they should have notified the
court of the progress on the administrative claims while litigating the first claim.
See id. Additionally, the plaintiffs could have requested a leave to amend under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a) which states, "a party may amend the party's
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be given freely when justice so requires." FED. R. Crv. P. 15(a); see also
Nernberg, 463 F. Supp. at 754 (discussing use of F.R.C.P. 15(a)).
25. See, e.g., Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 189-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing problem of claim preclusion in employment discrimination).
26. See id. at 184 (noting that action is matter of first impression in Third
Circuit).
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B.

Res Judicata and Claim Preclusion

There is a strong public policy favoring avoidance of "piecemeal" litigation in order to conserve judicial resources. 27 This is accomplished
through the principle of resjudicata, which prevents parties from relitigating claims that should or could have been raised in a previous action. 28
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies when the following factors are
satisfied: 1) there is a final judgment in a prior suit; 2) the same parties or
privities of those parties are involved; and 3) the subsequent suit is based
29
on the same cause of action.
1.

FinalJudgment

The first element of the claim preclusion test is an inquiry into
30
whether there was a final judgment on the merits of the previous case.
In many circumstances, this element is easily identified and met. 31 In
Churchill,the final judgment element was satisfied because ajudgment had
27. See id. at 194 (discussing purpose of claim preclusion); Bieg v. Hovnanian
Enters., No. CIV.A.98-5528, 1999 WL 1018578, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1999) (noting that res judicata prevents piecemeal litigation); Marshall v. Park Plaza Condominium Ass'n, No. CIV.A.98-2912, 1999 WL 689735, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1999)
(same); see also Kuczynski, supra note 4, at 1129 (discussing goals of resjudicata).
28. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998) (defining res
judicata); Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194 (discussing purpose of res judicata); Board of
Trustees of Trucking Employees v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992) (defining res judicata); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp, 929 F.2d 960, 964 (3d Cir. 1991)
(noting purpose of res judicata, or claim preclusion); McNasby v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing claim preclusion [resjudicata] as foreclosing litigation that could have been advanced earlier); Bieg, 1999
WL 1018578, at *3 (citing Churchil4 183 F.3d at 195); Sicoli v. Nabisco Biscuit Co.,
No. CIV.A.96-6053, 1998 WL 614840, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (defining res
judicata); Nernberg, 463 F. Supp. at 753 (noting that res judicata supports interest
of bringing all suits together).
Res judicata is an affirmative defense under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c): "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively
accord and satisfaction ....
resjudicata ... and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). As an affirmative defense,
the defendant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that res judicata applies in
the case. See United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984)
(noting that, for affirmative defense, defendant bears burden in resjudicata acts);
Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1982) (same). Additionally, if a defendant fails to plead res judicata affirmatively, he or she may lose
that defense. See EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 491 n.2 (3d Cir.
1990) (noting consequences of failing to comply with FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c)).
29. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194 (stating that claim preclusion is dispositive
when factors are met); Centra, 983 F.2d at 504 (listing test for claim preclusion);
Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983 (same); Sicoli, 1998 WL 614840, at *2 (same); Harding v.
Duquesne Light Co., No. CIV.A.95-589, 1995 WL 916926, at *2 (W.D. Pa. 1995)
(same).
30. See Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983 (listing elements of claim preclusion).
31. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 195 (noting that final judgment element was
clearly demonstrated); Centra, 983 F.2d at 504 (stating that first factor is easily
met); Harding, 1995 WL 916926, at *2 (stating that defendant easily proved first
factor).
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been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the previous action.3 2 In Harding,summary judgment in favor of the defendants satisfied the final judgment element.3 3 Additionally, a judgment entered by consent also
34
qualifies as a final judgment.
2.

Same Parties

The second element for claim preclusion is that the same parties must
be involved in both actions. 3 5 To satisfy this element, the parties have to
be the identical parties or be in privity with the identical parties from the
previous action. 36 For example, in Board of Trustees of TruckingEmployees v.
Centra,3 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
that even though one party changed, this new party had acquired one of
the previous parties, resulting in a privity relationship that satisfied the
second element of claim preclusion. 38 Thus, similar to the first element,
39
the second element is easily met.

3.

Same Cause of Action

Unlike the first two elements, the third requirement for claim preclusion-that the suits be based on the same cause of action-is a difficult
question. 40 In United States v. Athlone,41 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit noted that there is not a precise definition or a simple test to apply in determining whether the causes of action are the
32. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 195 ("There had been a final judgment on the
merits in Churchill I.").
33. See Harding, 1995 WL 916926, at *2 (finding that summary judgment is
final judgment).
34. See Centra, 983 F.2d at 504 (finding thatjudgment by consent satisfied first
prong of claim preclusion).
35. For a discussion on the elements of claim preclusion, see supra note 29
and accompanying text.
36. See Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *2 (noting that parties were exact parties
from previous action).
37. 983 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1992).
38. See id. at 504 (noting that "the Fund was a party to the prior suit, and
Centra, which acquired Mason-Dixon, is in privity with Mason-Dixon, the other
party in the suit").
39. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 195 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that
defendant clearly demonstrated second element); Bieg v. Hovnanian Enters., No.
CIV.A.98-5528, 1999 WL 1018578, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1999) (finding that parties were clearly identical to previous action); Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *2 (stating that the first and second elements are easily met).
40. See United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984)
(noting that court has struggled with identifying causes of action); Davis v. United
States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that identifying same
causes of action is more difficult element of res judicata); Harding, 1995 WL
916926, at *2 ("The third portion of the res judicata test is a more difficult
determination.").
41. 746 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1984).
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same. 42 The Athlone court compiled four factors to be considered in determining whether the two causes of action are identical. 43 The four factors are: 1) same acts and relief; 2) same theory of recovery; 3) same
witnesses and documents; and 4) same material facts. 4 4 Generally, the
analysis of determining the same cause of action focuses on whether the
45
underlying events of the claims were essentially the same.
C.

Procedurefor Bringing a Claim Under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission

47
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196446 ("Title VII") and the ADA
both require the plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies before filing
suit.48 Before a plaintiff can file suit, he or she must first file a complaint

42. See Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983 ("'[C]ause of action' cannot be precisely defined, nor can a simple test be cited for use in determining what constitutes a
cause of action for res judicata purposes.") (quoting Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v.
Accurate Products Co., 516 F.2d 583, 588 n.10 (3d Cir. 1975)); Sicoli v. Nabisco Biscuit Co., No. CIV.A.96-6053, 1998 WL 614840, *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (quoting Protocomm Corp. v. Novell, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-7774, 1998 WL 351605, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Jun. 30, 1998)).
43. See Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984 (considering four factors to determine claim
preclusion). Although the Athlone court noted that the factors were to be used in
the instant case, the factors have been used in subsequent cases to determine same
causes of action. See Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *2-3 (using test articulated in
Athlone to determine if two causes of action are identical).
44. See Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984 (listing four factors); Harding, 1995 WL
916926, at *2-3 (same). The factors were collected by previous decisions and added for purposes of the Athlone court. The first factor, accounting for same complaint and demand, was derived from Gissen v. Tackman. See Gissen v. Tackman,
401 F. Supp. 310, 312 (D.N.J. 1975) (analyzing if wrong in both actions was same),
vacated on other grounds by 537 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1976). Similarly, the third factor
regarding witnesses and documents was taken from O'Shea v. Chrysler Corp. See
O'Shea v. Chrysler Corp., 206 F. Supp. 601, 605-06 (D.N.J. 1962) (finding same
cause of action if evidence supporting first cause of action would also support second cause of action). The second and fourth factors were derived by the Athlone
court. See Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984 (discussing factors).
45. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999) ("A determination of whether two lawsuits are based on the same cause of action 'turn [s] on
the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal
claims.'" (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983)). This analysis takes a broad view of
the action, focusing on the facts of the cases, because there is not a precise test to
determine if the actions are the same cause of action. See id. (noting purpose of
looking at similarity of facts to determine same cause of action); see also Mathiason
et al., Interrelationshipof Administrative, Local, State, andFederal Claims and Procedures,
Issue Preclusion and Statute of Limitations Problems, C780 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 981, 1008
(1993) (noting that res judicata did not preclude claim based on different facts
from Tide VII claim).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994) (explaining administrative procedures
to be followed under Title VII); Churchill, 183 F.3d at 190 ("[A] party who brings
an employment discrimination claim under Tide I of the ADA must follow the
administrative procedures set forth in Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5."); see also Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984)
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with the EEOC. 49 The plaintiff must file the complaint within 180 days of
the alleged discriminatory act.5 0 After filing, the plaintiff must wait for the
(noting that prior to filing Title VII suit, plaintiff must file with EEOC); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398 (3d. Cir. 1976) (stating that filing
charges with EEOC is jurisdictional prerequisite for suit under Title VII); Shannon
v. City of Phila., No. CIV.A.98-5277, 1999 WL 126097, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1999)
("Prior to filing suit in federal court under the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust her
administrative remedies by filing a claim with the EEOC."); Lantz v. Hospital of the
Univ. of Pa., No. CIV.A.96-2671, 1996 WL 442795, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1996)
(noting lack of jurisdiction in federal courts for ADA and Title VII cases absent
timely filing with EEOC); Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J.
1994) (noting that plaintiff with ADA claim, like Title VII claim, must file with
EEOC as prerequisite to bringing suit).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 acts to eliminate discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1) (noting objective of Title VII); see also Charles C.Jackson et al., The
Proper Role of Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. Rv.
1485, 1485 (1981) (stating purpose of Title VII). Title I of the ADA prohibits
employment discrimination against qualified individuals on the basis of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (giving general rule regarding employment discrimination for disabled persons); see generally, 42 U.S.C. §12112(b) (defining
discriminatory practices).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (explaining procedures for filing with EEOC
prior to suit); Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237 (stating requirement to file with EEOC);
Berkoski v. Ashland Regional Med. Ctr., 951 F. Supp. 544, 547 (M.D. Pa. 1997)
(noting claim for unlawful discrimination under Title VII must be filed with
EEOC); Hughey v. North Phila. Health Sys., No. CIV.A.96-4695, 1996 WL 547396,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1996) ("Title VII requires that a plaintiff file charges with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ('EEOC') and receive a notice of
the right to sue before filing a complaint in federal court."); Jackson, supra note
48, at 1485 (stating that plaintiff "must first file with ... [the] EEOC which will
investigate the charge"). The purpose for first requiring an EEOC filing is to attempt to reach conciliation between the parties and better prevent employment
discrimination. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458
(1975) (noting purpose of filing with EEOC is to "promote voluntary compliance
with the requirements of Title VII"); Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 398 (discussing purpose of administrative action to settle by conciliation and persuasion as preferential over formal court proceedings); Schouten v. CSX Transp., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d
614, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1) ("A charge under this section shall be filed
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."); see also Holmes v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., No. CIV.A.97-4967, 1998
WL 564433, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1998) (noting Title VII requirement to file
with EEOC within 180 days); Berkoski, 951 F. Supp. at 547 (stating that time limit
for filing claim under Title VII is 180 days). Although the federal standard is 180
days, adjustments are often made for state claims combined with federal claims.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1) (allowing plaintiff additional time to file with
EEOC if they have filed with state agency first). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 states:
[when plaintiff] initially instituted proceedings with a State or local
agency ... such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the
State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or
local law, whichever is earlier ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1).
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EEOC to make a determination before he or she can proceed. 51 The

plaintiff will typically face one of the following three results: 1) receive a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and commence suit in federal court; 2)
wait 180 days without hearing from the EEOC and begin an individual
suit; or 3) learn that the EEOC has been successful in achieving a solution
52
and resolving the claim.
Federal law requires an EEOC filing to ensure that the parties at-

tempted a consensual solution to the alleged discrimination before filing
suit.53 Thus, a plaintiff will face negative consequences if he or she does
States, however, may have additional filing rules that a plaintiff must consider
when filing with both state and federal agencies. See Berkoski, 951 F. Supp. at 547
(discussing state procedure alterations to federal procedures); Lantz, 1996 WL
442795, at *2 (discussing Pennsylvania procedure requiring plaintiff to wait 60 (as
opposed to 30) days to pass without decision before being allowed to file with
EEOC). The differences in procedure prove to be important when a plaintiff is
suing under multiple federal and state statutes. See generally Churchill, 183 F.2d at
184 (exemplifying situation where plaintiff brings claims under two federal statutes
and one state statute).
The 180-day time period for administrative filing begins on the day that the
discriminatory act took place. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
256 (1980) (noting that complaint must be filed "within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred") (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1972)). The date of filing can effect the timeliness of the
action and, thus is often disputed. See id. at 259 (stating that there were three
possible dates that discrimination took place).
51. See Lantz, 1996 WL 442795, at *2 (noting that plaintiff must wait to hear
from EEOC before taking any additional action).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (outlining commission outcomes). The statute states:
If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) .. .is
dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days
from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) . . . , whichever is later, the Commission
has not filed a civil action under this section ...or the Commission has
not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved
is a party, the Commission . ..shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person
claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of
the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by
the alleged unlawful employment practice.
Id. See Churchil 183 F.3d 190 (stating "a party must wait 180 days after filing...
before being able to forego the administrative process and file suit in court");
Schouten, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (stating that plaintiff must receive right-to-sue letter
before filing suit); Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 424 (same).
53. See Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237 (noting purpose behind filing with EEOC);
Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 425 (noting purpose of EEOC procedures is to prevent
litigation by promoting voluntary compliance). The rationale behind the 180-day
limitation is that if the EEOC cannot reach a conciliation by that point and discrimination continues, it is unlikely that the EEOC will achieve a better result
through mediation efforts. See Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237 (discussing purpose behind
180 day limitation).
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not satisfy all administrative procedures. 54 Accordingly, the plaintiff has
an obligation to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an
action in court. 55 A failure to exhaust all administrative remedies can result in dismissal of the claim. 56 One way a plaintiff fails to exhaust all
administrative remedies is if he or she brings an action prior to receiving a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 5 7 A plaintiff may also fail to exhaust all
administrative remedies if he or she does not include all potential claims
in the EEOC filing.

58

The many requirements and potential pitfalls for completing an
59
EEOC filing can cause the process to take a significant amount of time.
Plaintiffs may experience complications because they are required to receive a right-to-sue letter to satisfy the requirement of exhausting all administrative remedies, but the EEOC is not bound by a time limit to
54. See Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 398 (holding that filing with EEOC is jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII claims); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1277 n.12 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that
employment discrimination claim can be dismissed for failure to timely file administrative complaint).

55. See Holmes, 1998 WL 564433, at *2 (stating plaintiffs obligation to "exhaust all administrative remedies"); Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 424 (implying that

plaintiff can be barred from bringing claim because of failure to exhaust all administrative remedies).
56. See Bishop, 864 F. Supp. at 424 (noting that plaintiff will be precluded from
bringing claim if all administrative remedies are not met).
57. See Shannon v. City of Phila., No. CIV.A.98-5277, 1999 WL 126097, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1999) (stating that plaintiff must have right-to-sue letter from
EEOC before filing suit); Hughey v. North Phila. Health Sys., No. CIV.A.96-4695,
1996 WL 547396, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1996) (finding "because the plaintiff
does not have a right to sue letter, this Court must find that she has not exhausted
her administrative remedies, and therefore lacks a legal claim upon which relief
can be granted"); Lantz v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., No. CIV.A.96-2671, 1996
WL 442795, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1996) (noting that plaintiff must wait for EEOC
right-to-sue letter before bringing claim in court).
58. See Sosa v. Floyd, No. CIV.A.98-CV-6602, 1999 WL 240070, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 1999) (holding that because plaintiff did not include retaliation claim
with racial discrimination claim in EEOC filing, he did not exhaust all administrative remedies). Additionally, a plaintiff has the obligation to plead properly that
all administrative remedies were satisfied before bringing suit. See Shannon, 1999
WL 126097, at *2 (noting that plaintiff must include all claims under EEOC to
satisfy a filing under EEOC).
59. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358 (1977) (computing time period between plaintiffs filing with EEOC and EEOC filing suit as
three years and two months, which resulted in claim being time-barred); Harter v.
GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 847 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that agency had not finished
proceedings for more than two years, violating statute of limitations on plaintiff's
non-EEOC claim); Lantz, 1996 WL 442795, at *1 (stating that right-to-sue was not
issued almost two years after complaint was filed with EEOC). The 180 day time
period for filing a complaint with the EEOC, however, was never intended to become a barrier to plaintiffs. See 118 CONG. REc. 7167-68 (1972) (noting that intention of time limitation was to "give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of
the law").
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provide that letter. 60 Therefore, although the statute of limitations for
EEOC claims tolls when a plaintiff files, the plaintiff may be unable to
bring the EEOC claim for years while the EEOC is attempting conciliation-resulting in the barring of non-EEOC claims for violation of the stat61
ute of limitations.
D.

When Res Judicata and Employment Jurisprudence Clash: The Development
of Law in the Third Circuit

In 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,62 set forth guidelines for an employment discrimination
claim based on multiple statutes. 6 3 Johnson noted that a plaintiff is able to
attempt recovery under multiple theories. 64 Additionally, the Court recognized that even though the statutory schemes of the employment discrimination acts are different, the plaintiff has an obligation to preserve
each claim independently, while simultaneously avoiding the pitfall of
60. See Occidental, 432 U.S. at 360 ("[No] section of the Act explicitly requires
the EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts and bring an enforcement suit within
any maximum period of time.").
61. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465-67 (1975) (holding EEOC filing failed to toll § 1981 statute of limitations); Shannon, 1999 WL
126097, at *4 (noting that statute of limitations for FMLA does not toll with EEOC
filing, and that FMLA action is time-barred because it was filed after two-year statute of limitations); Sanders v. Hale Fire Pump Co., No. CIV.A.87-2468, 1987 WL
17748, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1987) (finding statute of limitations for § 301 of

Labor Management Relations Act was not tolled by EEOC filing). There is strong
precedence that filing one action does not toll the statute of limitations for the
other potential actions. The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that
submitting a grievance on a non-EEOC action does not toll the statute of limitations for filing with the EEOC. See International Union of Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1976) (holding
that submission of non-EEOC grievance under collective bargaining agreement
did not toll period for filing Title VII charge under EEOC).
62. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
63. See generally id. (analyzing suit based on Title VII and § 1981). In Johnson,
the petitioner filed a charge with the EEOC based on his employer's alleged dis-

criminatory practices regarding seniority and job assignments. See id. at 455 (discussing basis for EEOC filing). A few weeks after the filing, the employer
terminated the petitioner who subsequently amended his charge to include discriminatory retaliation. See id. Approximately four years passed before the EEOC
granted the petitioner a right-to-sue letter allowing him to file a civil action against
his former employer. See id. at 455-56. Petitioner then filed an action with the
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee alleging violation of Title VII and § 1981. See id. at 456. The district court ruled that the § 1981
claim was barred because it had a one-year statute of limitations, which had expired during the EEOC proceedings. See id. (noting finding of district court). The
Supreme Court upheld this finding, holding that a petitioner cannot sleep on his
or her rights concerning non-EEOC claims. See id. at 466 (holding that petitioner
was barred from bringing § 1981 claim after expiration of statute of limitations).
64. See id. at 459 ("[T] he aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other
remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief.").
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claim preclusion.6 5 Many lower court decisions have since attempted to
66
analyze and apply the fine balance established in Johnson.
1.

Pitfalls in Litigating Multiple Employment JurisprudenceClaims

Resjudicata is often used as an effective defense when plaintiffs try to
litigate employment grievances in both state and federal courts. 67 In Rider
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,68 for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court decision barred the plaintiff from bringing a Title VII claim in federal court. 69 The court noted that if the plaintiffs claim were settled by
the holding in the Commonwealth court, the federal court was precluded
from hearing the Title VII claim. 70 The United States Court of Appeals
65. See id. at 465-66 (holding that by waiting for administrative conciliation on
Title VII to finish, plaintiff slept on § 1981 claim). Additionally, the Court addressed the plaintiff's obligation to ensure that all applicable claims were preserved. See id. at 466 ("We find no policy reason that excuses petitioner's failure to
take the minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim independently.").
66. For examples of applications of claim preclusion in employment jurisprudence in lower courts, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
67. See Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1988) ("When a plaintiff
relies on both state and federal law, the Restatement advocates claim preclusion,
provided that the first court to adjudicate the matter has jurisdiction to entertain
the omitted claim." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 25 (1982)); see
also Robert P. Morris, How Many Bites Are Enough? The Supreme Court's Decision in
University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 55 TENN. L. REv. 205, 206-07 (1988) (noting
Supreme Court decision giving state administrative decisions preclusive effect in
federal court).
68. 850 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1988).
69. See id. at 988 (noting that state court judgment has preclusive effect on
federal court actions). The Third Circuit based its decision on the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (stating that 'Judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State... from which they are taken"). The Third Circuit found
that the plaintiff's claim was barred by claim preclusion because the "very issue...
has been tried and decided, albeit by a state court." Rider, 850 F.2d at 995. Thus,
when a state court has decided an issue, the federal court is precluded from hearing the same claim. See id. (precluding state-adjudicated discrimination action).
But see, e.g., Mathiason, supra note 45, at 1005 (discussing case barring Title VII
lawsuit when plaintiff had previously filed discrimination charge with state
agency); Morris, supra note 67, at 228 (quoting Supreme Court decision that Congress did not intend for § 1738 to apply to state administrative agency findings);
Silver, supra note 2, at 371-72 (noting that courts traditionally held res judicata
inapplicable to state agency determinations, but administrative preclusion has
since "seeped into the landscape of the law").
70. See Rider, 850 F.2d at 988-89 (noting that if state courts would have dismissed Title VII claim, it would be barred under res judicata). In Rider, male
guards brought a claim because only female guards were being considered for
certain positions at the State Correctional Institution in Muncy, Pennsylvania. See
id. at 984-85. The State Correctional Institution placed only female guards in
those positions to protect the female prisoners' privacy rights. See id. at 985 (stating basis of pending claim). The plaintiffs first brought their claim to a union
arbitrator who found that the placing of the female guards violated Title VII be-
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for the Third Circuit in Bradley v. PittsburghBoard of Education,71 found that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision barred the plaintiff's federal
claim. 72 Bradley is unique because "the preclusion argument would apply
equally to [plaintiff's] equal protection and retaliatory discharge claims
even if Bradley had stated claims for relief."73 Thus, Third Circuit courts
4
are clear that state actions are preclusive for federal court claims.?
Some of the res judicata problems that plaintiffs face when seeking
relief under both state and federal claims are particular to employment
discrimination as a result of the requirements to exhaust both state and
federal administrative procedures. 75 If a plaintiff fails to exhaust all ad76
ministrative remedies for a state claim, that claim will be dismissed.
Thus, if a plaintiff fails to file under both the EEOC and the state administrative agency, he or she can be barred from recovering under all of his or
her claims. 77 The Third Circuit, however, does not require the plaintiff to
perform the impossible. 78 In McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 79 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit allowed
the plaintiff to bring claims in both federal and state court when the plain-

cause it did not qualify as a privacy right protected as a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification ("BFOQ"). See id. at 985-86. The defendant then appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court , which subsequently
vacated the arbitrator's decision. See id. at 986. While pending appeal on the
Commonwealth court decision, the plaintiffs brought a Title VII action in the district court. See id. at 987. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim because
of res judicata, disagreeing with the plaintiffs' argument that the Commonwealth
court decision did not rule on the merits of federal claims, thereby not having a
preclusive effect. See id. at 987-88. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
findings based on a belief that the lower court's decision was dispositive of the
male guards' Title VII claims. See id. at 989 n.9.
71. 913 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).
72. See Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1068-69 (noting preclusive effect of state claims).
73. Id. at 1069.
74. See id. (noting that state proceedings barred plaintiffs First Amendment
federal claim).
75. For a discussion on state administrative procedures, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
76. See Schouten v. CSX Transp. Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(finding that plaintiff's claim was barred under Pennsylvania Human Rights
Amendment ("PHRA") for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies).
77. See Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir.
1990) (noting state agency procedure requiring plaintiff who received right-to-sue
letter from EEOC to refile with Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission to secure
state claims). But see Fosburg v. Lehigh Univ., No. C1V.A.98-CV-864, 1999 WL
124458, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1999) (rejecting argument that "mere filing with
the EEOC did not deem the charge to have been filed with the PHRA").
78. See McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 1989)
(recognizing unfairness in precluding litigant from claim that he or she could not
have raised in previous suit).
79. 888 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1989).
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tiff was unable to bring her Title VII claim in state court for lack of jurisdiction.80 Thus, the plaintiffs claim was not precluded.8 1
Additionally, plaintiffs must be careful when filing and pleading to
8
82
For example, in Polay v. West Co., 3
preserve all claims in the filing stage.
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
would not hear the plaintiff's claims because the right-to-sue letter was not
granted for all claims. 8 4 Plaintiffs also must be careful not to trap themselves in a corner by pleading claims in one action that are pending in
another action. 85 In Molthan v. Temple University,8 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a claim listed in a pretrial memorandum barred the plaintiff from bringing that claim in a sec87
ond action, even though the claim was never pled in the first action.
This holding was based on the fact that the court is able to try all com88
plaints that are "'fairly within the scope' of a prior EEOC complaint."

2.

Current Trend in Third Circuitfor Claim Preclusion in Employment
Jurisprudence

Many decisions in employment jurisprudence addressing claim preclusion have left a complicated, and often confusing, body of law for Third
Circuit practitioners to follow.8 9 A plaintiffs EEOC claims are sometimes
precluded even when he or she takes all the proper steps.9 0 The main
problem a plaintiff faces is that he or she may be barred from bringing
80. See id. at 277 ("Plaintiffs did not and could not have raised their Title VII

claims before the PHRC."); see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS

§ 26 cmt.

c (1982) (stating that "it is unfair to preclude [a plaintiff] from a second action in
which he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from
presenting in the first").
81. See McNasby, 888 F.2d at 279 (holding plaintiff was not barred from bringing Title VII action).
82. For a discussion regarding the importance of preserving all claims, see
infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
83. 629 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
84. See id. at 901-02 (noting that Title VII claim was being litigated by EEOC,
barring plaintiff from including Title VII claim in personal claim). The Eastern
District stated that they will consider all claims that could reasonably be included
under the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC: "I will allow plaintiff to include in the
complaint all her claims which pertain to discriminatory actions which allegedly
occurred during plaintiff's employment." Id. at 901.
85. See, e.g., Molthan v. Temple Univ., 778 F.2d 955, 958-60 (3d Cir. 1985)
(discussing that action was included in pretrial motion and filed separately).
86. 778 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1985).
87. See id. at 959 ("It is my intention to try this case as it is reflected in the
parties' pretrial memoranda filed in September and October 1982, which have
governed this action until the present moment.").
88. Id. at 960 (quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984)).
89. For an analysis of current Third Circuit and district court opinions, see
infra notes 89-118 and accompanying text.
90. See EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that plaintiffs who had fully litigated individual claims with defendant
were barred from recovery under EEOC filing).
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claims based on separate theories in separate actions.9 1 In Harding the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held
that if multiple claims are based on the same cause of action, the plaintiff
is required to bring all the claims in one action and must take steps to
satisfy that requirement.9 2 This decision has been extended and supported in Churchill and, most recently, in Boykins v. Lucent Technologies,
93
Inc.

III.
A.

ANALYSiS

Interpretationof Claim Preclusion in Employment Jurisprudence

The Third Circuit recently began to give plaintiffs instructions for recovering under multiple statutory bases in employment discrimination
cases. 9 4 These instructions, however, are spread throughout multiple
opinions, making it difficult for a practitioner to have a full picture of his
95
or her client's rights and responsibilities in employment law.
1.

Third Circuit Application of Claim Preclusion

In 1995, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania addressed the problem of claim preclusion in employment
jurisprudence. 9 6 In Harding,the plaintiff brought an action based on violation of the ADA and other statutes after receiving an unfavorable judgment ("Harding I") against the same defendant in a previous lawsuit
91. See Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Title VII claim was barred because it could have been brought in previous
action based on Labor Management Relations Act). The plaintiff filed her Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA") action while the administrative proceedings
were still pending on her Title VII claim. See id. at 37. She brought the action at
that time in order to prevent the statute of limitations from running on her LMRA
claim. See id. (noting statute of limitations for LMRA claim). The district court
found that the dismissal of her LMRA claim barred her Title VII claim because of
resjudicata. See id. at 38. Additionally, the Second Circuit rejected the argument
that "res judicata should not apply to situations like the one presented here because application of the doctrine would be inconsistent with the scheme of Title
VII." See id. at 39. The Second Circuit based their decision on the principle and
purpose of res judicata, preventing litigation that could have been brought in the
same action from being brought in a separate action. See id. (holding that purpose
of Title VII does not prevent application of res judicata in this case).
92. See Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., No. CIV.A.95-589, 1995 WL 916926, at
*3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1995) (finding that ADA claim was barred because it was
based on same cause of action as previous claim); see also Kelley v. TYK Refractories
Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1196 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that claim is not precluded when
issues are distinct).
93. 78 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
94. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing
plaintiffs options to preserve all claims); Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *4.
95. For a discussion of the many different opinions, see infra notes 96-118 and
accompanying text.
96. See Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *2 (holding that claim is barred on basis
of res judicata).
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bought under the. Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 9 7
The district court in Hardingfound that the previous suit had resulted in a
final judgment on a single cause of action. 98
After the dismissal of Harding I, the plaintiff, in Harding,brought a
second action (Harding II) against the same defendants based on the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title I of the ADA and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). 99 The district court found that these
claims were based on the same cause of action as Harding I, and were
therefore subject to claim preclusion. 10 0 Additionally, the district court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that because he was seeking recovery on
different theories of employment law, the claims could not be precluded. 10 1 The district court reiterated the current trend in dealing with
claim preclusion, explaining that "the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
taken a broad view of what amounts to an identity of causes of action, with
102
the focus being on the underlying events in both actions."
Additionally, the district court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
he was unable to bring the second claim with the first because of time
restraints and administrative remedies. 10 3 Although the court recognized
97. See id. at *1 (discussing previous case (Harding I) and its preclusive effect). The plaintiff based his cause of action on his termination from defendant
company on January 11, 1993, after he tested positive for using a controlled substance. See id. In HardingI the plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to severance
pay and employee benefits because he was terminated as a result of his disability,
which fell under ERISA. See id. The Western District of Pennsylvania granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case. See id. (stating
finding of Harding I).

98. See id. ("Defendant's Motion as to Plaintiff's ERISA claims was granted
and a final judgment on the merits thereby issued.").
99. See id.

100. See id. at *2-3 (holding that Harding I and Harding II are based on same

cause of action and are thus subject to claim preclusion). The district court first
analyzed the three requirements of claim preclusion: 1) final judgment in previous
suit; 2) same parties from previous suit; and 3)same cause of action. See id. at *2.
For a discussion on the factors of claim preclusion, see supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text. In analyzing those factors, the Western District found that the
claims consisted of the same cause of action and were therefore subject to res
judicata. See Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *3 ("Comparing Harding I and Harding

II... I find that both suits constitute the same 'cause of action.'").

101. See Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *3 (holding that differing theories of
recovery was ineffective defense to res judicata); see also Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State and Federal Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 18 WHITrIER L. REv. 499, 509-10 (1997) ("The court stated that the question of whether two causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes does
not depend on the legal theory invoked, but on the 'primary right' involved in the
two actions.").
102. Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *3.
103. See id. at *4 ("I have considered and rejected Plaintiffs contention that
he could not have included his Harding II claim with his previous cause of action
involving his termination due to statutory requirement for initial administrative
review by EEOC, OFCCP, and PHRC.").
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time constraints imposed on the plaintiff, it denied recovery on this theory
10 4
because of the strong principle of res judicata.
The Third Circuit revisited the Harding holding four years later in
Churchill.10 5 As a matter of first impression in the Third Circuit, the court
precluded a claim based on the ADA and the PHRA because of a prior
court decision based on the FMLA. 10 6 Churchill had been employed by
the defendant company for five years when she was diagnosed with oral
cancer.10 7 After requesting accommodations under the FMLA to deal
08
with her illness, she was terminated from her position.
On May 20, 1997, Churchill brought her first claim against Star Enterprises based on the FMIA ("Churchill 1").109 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff on February 17, 1998, based on the FMLA claim. 10 During Churchill I, the plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies with
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") and the EEOC
for the PHRA and ADA claims."' She had commenced the filing on February 26, 1997 (prior to filing in court for Churchill I), and received her
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on April 26, 1998.112 Thus, she received
her right-to-sue letter approximately two months after a decision was ren11
dered on Churchill 1. 3
On April 2, 1998, Churchill filed a complaint against the defendants
based on the ADA, the PHRA and other statutes ("Churchill Ir'). 1 1 4 The
104. See id. (finding that permitting plaintiff to split his cause of action would
violate res judicata).
105. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 195 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting

that claims were based on identical causes of action and, therefore, subject to res
judicata).
106. See id. at 184 (noting that, as matter of first impression, claims brought

under current case were barred because ofjudgment on claims in previous case).
107. See id. at 187.
108. See id. Churchill immediately notified the defendant of her illness and
her need to undergo treatment. See id. (describing facts and procedural history).
A couple of months after her diagnosis, Churchill underwent several surgical operations and radiation procedures, but continued to work. See id. (discussing extent
of medical treatment). She made many requests to defendant for reasonable accommodations for her injury that were never addressed; she then requested leave
under the FMLA, which precipitated her termination. See id. (discussing defendant's response to complaints under FMLA).
109. See id. at 187-88 (noting content of Churchill I).
110. See id. (recounting lower court decision in favor of plaintiff). Churchill
was awarded double-liquidated damages and interest, and the Court ordered that
she be reinstated to an equivalent position. See id. (detailing damages for plaintiff). Additionally, Churchill received partial attorney's fees and costs. See id.
111. See id. (noting plaintiff's separate claims).
112. See id. Before she received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the
PHRC dismissed the state claim on November 14, 1997. See id.
113. See id. (noting time period between Churchill I and exhaustion of administrative remedies).
114. See id. at 188-89 (listing bases for Churchill II).
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defendants immediately asserted the affirmative defense of res judicata
based on the proceedings and the final judgment on Churchill 1.115 The
district court found in favor of the defendants on the basis of claim preclusion. 116 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that Churchill II should not be
precluded because a plaintiff should not have to wait for the exhaustion of
administrative proceedings in order to bring all claims together, if waiting
results in stale non-EEOC claims. 1 17 The Third Circuit, however, rejected
this argument, noting that because the two suits were based on the same
cause of action, the plaintiff was required to consolidate all claims into
118
one case.
2.

Advice for Future Plaintiffs

Although the district courts and the Third Circuit have been strict in
not allowing plaintiffs to bring separate claims for the same cause of action, they have provided guidelines to aid subsequent plaintiffs in avoiding
the pitfalls of res judicata in employment jurisprudence.' 1 9 In Harding,
the district court gave instructions for future plaintiffs facing a statute of
limitations on one claim and exhaustion of administrative remedies on

others. 120 According to the court, the "[p]laintiff could easily have taken
one of several possible steps to insure compliance with the two year statute
of limitations ... without splitting his cause of action." 12 1 The first remedy is for the plaintiff to file claims before the statute of limitations runs
and to ask the court for a stay while administrative proceedings are pending. 122 The second remedy is for the plaintiff to be more assertive and
request a right-to-sue letter shortly after the expiration of the administrative period and either: 1) bring both claims together; or 2) ask for leave to
123
amend the initial complaint.
115. See id. at 189 (noting defendant's motion to dismiss and court's entry for
judgment on pleadings).
116. See id. at 189 (discussing procedural history); Churchill v. Star Enters., 3
F. Supp. 2d 625, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("We conclude that Churchill I and Churchill
II involve the same cause of action because the underlying events in both cases are
the same.").
117. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 190 (noting plaintiffs argument for finding
against claim preclusion).
118. See id. at 191 (stating "Churchill should have moved to consolidate").
119. See id. (explaining options to bring all claims together); Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., No. CIV.A.95-589, 1995 WL 916926, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4,

1995) (discussing alternatives to splitting cause of action).
120. See Harding,1995 WL 916926, at *4 (suggesting solutions for claim preclusion problem).
121. Id.
122. See id.

123. See id. (suggesting that plaintiff request right-to-sue letter early and
amend complaints); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (stating that "a party may amend
the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires").
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In Churchill, the Third Circuit provided similar solutions for plaintiffs
who have both EEOC and non-EEOC claims pending and fear that the
statute of limitations will run or that the non-EEOC claim will become
stale. 124 First, in a case similar to Churchill, where the claims were only two
months apart, a plaintiff can request to consolidate the claims by joining
the EEOC claims with the non-EEOC claims. 125 Second, the plaintiff can
request a right-to-sue letter after the administrative period has expired. 126
The EEOC is required to issue the right-to-sue letter on request after the
time period has expired. 127 Third, the plaintiff could have requested a
stay in the proceedings while she awaited the right-to-sue letter. 128

B.

Practitioners'Formulafor Preserving Claims in Employment Discrimination
Suits in the Third Circuit

Through its rulings, the Third Circuit has developed a formula for
practitioners to follow when litigating an employment discrimination
claim with multiple statutory bases.' 29 The practitioner must act carefully
to secure preservation of all employment discrimination claims.13 0 Additionally, a plaintiff's practitioner has to follow the appropriate administrative procedures where applicable. 13 ' In order to secure all claims and not
violate the doctrine of res judicata, a practitioner should adhere to the
132
following general formula.

124. See Churchill,183 F.3d at 191 (providing methods plaintiff can use to consolidate actions).
125. See id. at 191 (noting timing of EEOC actions). The Third Circuit noted
that "prior to the start of the trial in Churchill I, Churchill knew that the PHRC
had dismissed her PHRA complaint, and accordingly she could have brought an
action on that claim about three months before Churchill I went to trial." Id.
126. See id. (explaining plaintiffs right to request right-to-sue letter).
127. See id. ("Thus... well before the Churchill I trial, [plaintiff] could have
requested a right to sue letter."). The court noted that Churchill sat on her rights
by not requesting the right-to-sue letter in time to bring both actions together. See
id. (discussing results of failure to act on time). Thus, she was barred from bringing the claim in a second action. See id. (noting that Churchill waited for EEOC to
issue right-to-sue letter).
128. See id. (discussing alternative to request stay).
129. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's formula, see infra notes 133-51
and accompanying text.
130. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975)
(recognizing plaintiffs obligation to take necessary steps in preserving all applicable claims).
131. For a discussion on administrative remedies in employment discrimination claims, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
132. For a list of steps practitioners should take in order to preserve all claims,
see infra notes 133-51 and accompanying text.
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Step One-ProperPleading and Filing to Secure Multiple Claims

The first pitfall practitioners must avoid when pursuing multiple
claims is the failure to plead and file claims properly. 133 If a practitioner
1 34
does not file a claim in a timely manner, the claim may be time-barred.
Additionally, if the plaintiffs practitioner fails to complete the filing with
the EEOC, the administrative remedies may not be exhausted for all of the
potential claims. 13 5 A court is allowed to consider all reasonable claims
that might have been subject to investigation under the EEOC charges for
which a right-to-sue letter was issued, but courts will not permit a plaintiff
to pursue substantially different claims for which a letter has not been
issued. 13 6 Thus, a litigant must be careful to include all potential claims in
filings to prevent preclusion from bringthe pleadings and administrative
137
ing any one of the claims.
2.

Step Two-Early Request of Right-to-Sue Letter

The Third Circuit has clearly stated that a claim is not ripe until the
plaintiff receives a right-to-sue letter. 13 8 A problem that the Churchill
plaintiff faced was that she was waiting for her right-to-sue letter before
filing her EEOC suit. 139 Although the EEOC requires a plaintiff to possess
a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff can request a right-to-sue letter after the
EEOC has reviewed the claim for 180 days. 140 In fact, if requested, the
EEOC is obligated to issue a right-to-sue letter after the 180-day time period.' 4 1 Thus, if the non-EEOC claim will not be time-barred 180 days
133. See, e.g., Wayne N. Outten, What a PlaintiffsLauyer Looksfor When Evaluating a Potential Lawsuit, 562 PLI/LIT, Apr. 1997, at 23, 44 (discussing that plaintiff
should include all colorable federal and state claims in complaint when litigating
multiple causes of action).
134. See Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (holding that plaintiff's § 1981 claim was barred by statute of limitations).
135. See Polay v. West Co., 629 F. Supp. 899, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that
Title VII action was not allowed because plaintiff failed to obtain right-to-sue
letter).
136. See id. (noting that court can consider all claims reasonably subject to
investigation under EEOC charge).
137. See, e.g., id. (refusing to hear claims for which right-to-sue letter has not
been issued).

138. For a discussion on the necessity of securing a right-to-sue letter in the
Third Circuit, see supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
139. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
EEOC requirements).
140. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975)
(holding that if EEOC has not resolved or filed complaint within 180 days, plaintiff
may "demand a right-to-sue letter and institute the Title VII action himself without
waiting for the completion of the conciliation procedures"); Digests of Recent Opinions: Churchill v. Star Enterprises, PA. L. WKLY., July 26, 1999, at 20 (noting that
plaintiff could have requested right-to-sue letter from EEOC).
141. See McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 274 n.3 (3d Cir.
1989) ("If a charge filed with the EEOC is dismissed or if the EEOC has not filed a
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from the EEOC filing, the practitioner can wait, request a right-to-sue let142
ter and bring the EEOC and the non-EEOC actions together.
3.

Step Three-Requesting Leave to Amend

If, however, the statute of limitations on the non-EEOC charge will
run in fewer than 180 days, the plaintiffs practitioner must bring that
claim separately from the EEOC claim. 143 Thus, a practitioner must secure all claims separately.144 If faced with this situation, a practitioner
could file the non-EEOC action, wait for the 180-day period to expire, and
145
then ask for a leave in order to amend to include the EEOC claims.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Third Circuit will grant
1 46
leave to amend freely as justice requires.
4.

Step Four-Requestinga Stay on the Proceedings of the First Action

In addition to asking leave to amend, a practitioner can file the nonEEOC claim and then request that the lawsuit on the first claim be stayed,
pending results from the EEOC. 147 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
has noted that a balance must be weighed between prejudicing the plaintiff by not allowing a recovery on all actions and prejudicing the defendant
by delaying the cause of action. 148 If, however, the plaintiff has met his or
her burden in demonstrating that a hardship will exist if the stay is denied,
that showing will outweigh the prejudice to the defendant. 149 When recivil action against the party . . . within 180 days after the charge was filed, the
EEOC must, if requested, issue a right-to-sue letter to the complainant.").
142. See Churchil4 183 F.3d at 191 (explaining plaintiffs obligation to request
right-to-sue letter and consolidate all claims in one cause of action); see also Mo-

berly, supra note 101, at 526 (noting that plaintiff must be able to consolidate
multiple claims with same cause of action in same forum).
143. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 466 (discussing importance of filing non-EEOC
claim (§ 1981) prior to running of statute of limitations). This separate filing is a
necessity because filing for one claim will not toll the statute of limitations for the
outstanding claims. See id. (holding that administrative filing for Title VII did not
toll statute of limitations for § 1981).
144. See id. (explaining plaintiff's obligation to preserve all claims
independently).
145. See Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752, 754 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(discussing plaintiffs ability to advise court of administrative proceedings and request leave to amend).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (allowing judge freedom to grant leave to
amend).
147. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465 (acknowledging option for plaintiff to "ask
the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and
voluntary compliance have been completed"). The Court does note, however, that
this option is not the most favored option for plaintiffs. See id. (noting that requesting stay is not "highly satisfactory").
148. See Sicoli v. Nabisco Biscuit Co., No. CIV.A.96-6053, 1998 WL 614840, at
*1-2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (noting potential prejudice to defendant if stay is

granted).
149. See id. at *2 (finding that plaintiff met burden to prove hardship because
subsequent EEOC claim would be precluded).
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questing a stay, the practitioner must make a clear request before the trial
begins or the stay may be denied. 150 In Churchill, although the court was
made aware of the potential EEOC claims, that knowledge did not consist
15 1
of a proper request for a stay.
IV.

POTENTIAL FUTURE APPLICATIONS AND UNANSWERED ISSUES

Churchill was a matter of first impression in the Third Circuit because
it was the first occasion where the Third Circuit reviewed a case already
litigated under the FMLA.' 52 The Churchill court noted, however, that al153
Thus, it is likely
though the facts were new, the applicable law was not.
that when the Third Circuit faces future, similar cases based on different
fact patterns or based on different employment statutes, the result will be

similar to Churchill. This prediction is further supported by the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania's recent decision in Boykins. In Boykins, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff was barred from bringing a
§ 1981 claim with a Title VII claim because the statute of limitations for
the § 1981 claim had run while the plaintiff was exhausting administrative
remedies for the Title VII claim. 154 The district court gave very little explanation when dismissing the § 1981 claim. 155 Thus, the effective rules
for lawsuits based on both EEOC and non-EEOC claims are becoming
fixed; therefore, it is probable that, although Churchill was technically a
matter of first impression, future cases with both EEOC and non-EEOC
1 56
claims will yield similar results.

Although the claim preclusion principles in Churchill produce a
formula for similar cases, inevitably there will be cases that will fall outside
the formula, causing additional problems for litigants and courts in the
150. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that reference to administrative claims during side-bar conference was insufficient
as request for stay and that request should be made prior to trial).
151. See id. ("While these evidentiary proceedings demonstrate that the court
was aware of the administrative claims, they surely do not include a motion for a
stay.").
152. See id. 189 (noting that this was first occasion that any circuit was
presented with assertion of claim preclusion barring claim previously litigated
under the FMLA).
153. See id. ('Yet while the constellation of facts in this case is new, the principles of the doctrine of claim preclusion are familiar.").
154. See Boykins v. Lucent Techs., 78 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding § 1981 claim was time-barred). The plaintiff avoided running into claim
preclusion by bringing his Title VII, PHRA, and § 1981 claims together in one
action. See id. at 405 (listing statutory bases for plaintiff's claim). While the plaintiff was correct in bringing all the claims together, he did not satisfy the requirement of preserving all claims when they accrued. See id. at 409 (noting that
plaintiff failed to bring complaint for two years after discriminatory conduct,
thereby failing to satisfy statute of limitations).
155. See generally id. (concluding that only § 1981 claim was time-barred).
156. See id. (holding plaintiff was barred from bringing non-EEOC claim).
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Third Circuit.1 57 Specifically, this Casebrief has dealt with claim preclusion when an individual brings multiple claims. 15 8 A Third Circuit practitioner, however, may have to concern himself or herself with claim
preclusion when the EEOC decides to litigate the EEOC action, and the
plaintiff has additional individual non-EEOC actions against the same
15 9
defendant.
This problem was identified in EEOC v. United States Steel Corp.1 60 The
EEOC decided to bring a suit against the defendants, and the Third Circuit ruled that employees who had previously fully litigated on individual
claims were precluded from receiving benefits secured by the EEOC action. 161 Conversely, a plaintiff who recovers under an EEOC action is
barred from bringing an individual action after resolution of a claim
brought by the EEOC.1 6 2 Thus, when the EEOC brings a claim against
the defendant, an individual plaintiff has to choose which claim he or she
wishes to recover under-either the EEOC claim or the non-EEOC
claim-because the second claim will be precluded by the first.' 63 The
Third Circuit has yet to rule on this issue since its decision in Churchill,
and it remains to be seen if a similar formula will be developed for practitioners who find themselves in this unique position.
Victoria L. Hooper

157. See, e.g., EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1990)
(addressing claim preclusion in case where plaintiffs had individual claims and
EEOC brought claim on plaintiffs' behalf).
158. For a discussion on the problems facing plaintiffs with multiple individual employment discrimination claims, see supra notes 67-88 and accompanying
text.
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994) (noting that EEOC may bring civil
action against respondents if conciliation efforts fail after 30 days); see also Annotation, Res Judicata Effect ofJudgment in Class Action Upon Subsequent Action in Federal
Court, 48 A.L.R. FED. 675, 679 (1980) ("While it is true that a person cannot ordinarily be bound (or estopped) by the results of anyjudicial proceeding to which he is
not a party... class actions are a recognized exception to the general rule."). It
has been recognized that when the EEOC is bringing a claim on behalf of a class,
its actions can bar members of the class from recovering on other grounds. See id.
at 680 (discussing EEOC as proper representative of class to bar members from
further claims (citing EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 570 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1978))).
160. 921 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1990).
161. See id. at 495 ("The underlying policy of res judicata ...surely applies
with no less force in those instances in which the individual has actually litigated
on his own behalf than in those in which the preclusive litigation seeking private
benefits was conducted by a representative.").
162. See id. ("Moreover, as previously noted, the doctrine of representative
claim preclusion generally applies equally regardless of the sequence of
litigation.").
163. See id. at 496 (holding that plaintiffs were precluded from recovering
under both EEOC action and individual claim to "prevent undue hardship to the
defendant").
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